publication . Part of book or chapter of book . Preprint . 2013

designing markets for daily deals

Cai, Yang; Mahdian, Mohammad; Mehta, Aranyak; Waggoner, Bo;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Oct 2013
  • Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Abstract
Comment: This is the full version of the paper appearing at WINE 2013 Proceedings of the Ninth Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE-13). 2013
Subjects
ACM Computing Classification System: TheoryofComputation_GENERAL
free text keywords: Social Welfare, Microeconomics, Welfare, media_common.quotation_subject, media_common, Externality, Expected utility hypothesis, Computer science, Private information retrieval, Common value auction, Payment, Revenue, Mathematical economics, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, F.0, J.4
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publication . Part of book or chapter of book . Preprint . 2013

designing markets for daily deals

Cai, Yang; Mahdian, Mohammad; Mehta, Aranyak; Waggoner, Bo;