publication . Preprint . 2018

Optimal Resource Allocation over Networks via Lottery-Based Mechanisms

Phade, Soham R.; Anantharam, Venkat;
Open Access English
  • Published: 02 Dec 2018
We show that, in a resource allocation problem, the ex ante aggregate utility of players with cumulative-prospect-theoretic preferences can be increased over deterministic allocations by implementing lotteries. We formulate an optimization problem, called the system problem, to find the optimal lottery allocation. The system problem exhibits a two-layer structure comprised of a permutation profile and optimal allocations given the permutation profile. For any fixed permutation profile, we provide a market-based mechanism to find the optimal allocations and prove the existence of equilibrium prices. We show that the system problem has a duality gap, in general, a...
arXiv: Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
free text keywords: Economics - Theoretical Economics, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, Computer Science - Networking and Internet Architecture, Mathematics - Optimization and Control, Quantitative Finance - Risk Management
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Funded by
NSF| EARS: Spectrum Sharing for Short-Latency Immersive Wireless Applications
  • Funder: National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Project Code: 1343398
  • Funding stream: Directorate for Engineering | Division of Electrical, Communications & Cyber Systems
NSF| Emerging Frontiers of Science of Information
  • Funder: National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Project Code: 0939370
  • Funding stream: Directorate for Computer & Information Science & Engineering | Division of Computing and Communication Foundations
NSF| NeTS: Small: PTERA: Prospect Theory Enhanced Resource Allocation
  • Funder: National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Project Code: 1527846
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