publication . Preprint . 2017

Design of Distributed Voting Systems

Meter, Christian;
Open Access English
  • Published: 08 Feb 2017
Abstract
Countries like Estonia, Norway or Australia developed electronic voting systems, which could be used to realize parliamentary elections with the help of personal computers and the Internet. These systems are completely different in their design and their way to solve the same problem. In this thesis, we analyze some of the largest real-world systems, describe their building blocks and their general design to focus on possible problems in these electronic voting systems. Furthermore, we present a template for an e-voting system, which we designed to try to fulfill the preliminaries and requirements of a secure electronic voting system. We use the experiences and ...
Subjects
free text keywords: Computer Science - Cryptography and Security
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99 4.1 Summary of Estonian Voting System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.2 Summary of DVBM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 4.3 Compare received SMS with the Codes on the Poll Card . . . . . . . . 33 4.4 Summary of the Norwegian I-Voting System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.5 Summary of iVote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 4.6 Summary of Civitas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4.7 Comparing the Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5.1 Suggested Building Blocks of a Voting System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 [Abe00] ABE, Masayuki: Universally verifiable mix-net with verification work independentofthenumberofmix-servers. In: IEICE TransactionsonFundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences E82-A (2000), Nr. 7, pp. 1431-1440. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BFb0054144. DOI 10.1007/BFb0054144. ISSN 09168508.

[Adi08] ADIDA, Ben: Helios: Web-based Open-Audit Voting. In: USENIX Security Symposium (2008), 335-348. https://www.usenix.org/legacy/ event/sec08/tech/full_papers/adida/adida.pdf.

[BGN01] BLAIS, André; GIDENGIL, Elisabeth; NEVITTE, Neil: Do Polls Influence the Vote? (2001), 263-279. https://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/ 0472099213-ch11.pdf.

[Bit15a] BITCOIN WIKI: Scalability. https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/ Scalability. Version: September 2015.

[Bit15b] BITCONGRESS.ORG: Decentralized Voting Platform. http://www. bitcongress.org. Version: August 2015.

[Blu15] BLUEKRYPT: Keylength - Cryptographic Key Length from Fact Sheet NSA Suite B Cryptography (2015). http://www.keylength.com/en/6/. Version: September 2015.

[BPW12] BERNHARD, David; PEREIRA, Olivier; WARINSCHI, Bogdan: How not to prove yourself: Pitfalls of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic and applications to Helios. In: Advances in Cryptology-ASIACRYPT 2012. Springer, 2012, pp. 626-643.

[Cha06] CHAOS COMPUTER CLUB E.V.: Bericht der CCC-Wahlbeobachtergruppe von der Oberbürgermeisterwahl in Cottbus. http://www.ccc.de/de/ updates/2006/bericht-ob-wahl-cottbus. Version: 2006.

[Cha13] CHAOS COMPUTER CLUB E.V.: Trügerische Sicherheit - Der elektronische Personalausweis. http://www.ccc.de/de/updates/2013/ epa-mit-virenschutzprogramm. Version: September 2013.

[Coi14] COINDESK: The Bitcoin Mining Arms Race - GHash.io and the 51% Issue. http://www.coindesk.com/ bitcoin-mining-detente-ghash-io-51-issue. Version: July 2014.

[CSWH01] CLARKE, Ian; SANDBERG, Oskar; WILEY, Brandon; HONG, Tw: Freenet: A distributed anonymous information storage and retrieval system. In: Designing Privacy Enhancing . . . (2001), 46-66. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1007/3-540-44702-4_4. DOI 10.1007/3-540-44702-4_4. ISBN 978-3-540-44702-3.

[DAM+15] DURUMERIC, Zakir; ADRIAN, David; MIRIAN, Ariana; BAILEY, Michael; HALDERMAN, J. A.: Tracking the FREAK Attack. https:// freakattack.com. Version: April 2015.

[DDM03] DANEZIS, G.; DINGLEDINE, R.; MATHEWSON, N.: Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol. In: 2003 Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2003. (2003). http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI. 2003.1199323. DOI 10.1109/SECPRI.2003.1199323. ISBN 0-7695- 1940-7.

Abstract
Countries like Estonia, Norway or Australia developed electronic voting systems, which could be used to realize parliamentary elections with the help of personal computers and the Internet. These systems are completely different in their design and their way to solve the same problem. In this thesis, we analyze some of the largest real-world systems, describe their building blocks and their general design to focus on possible problems in these electronic voting systems. Furthermore, we present a template for an e-voting system, which we designed to try to fulfill the preliminaries and requirements of a secure electronic voting system. We use the experiences and ...
Subjects
free text keywords: Computer Science - Cryptography and Security
Download from

99 4.1 Summary of Estonian Voting System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.2 Summary of DVBM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 4.3 Compare received SMS with the Codes on the Poll Card . . . . . . . . 33 4.4 Summary of the Norwegian I-Voting System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4.5 Summary of iVote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 4.6 Summary of Civitas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4.7 Comparing the Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 5.1 Suggested Building Blocks of a Voting System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 [Abe00] ABE, Masayuki: Universally verifiable mix-net with verification work independentofthenumberofmix-servers. In: IEICE TransactionsonFundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences E82-A (2000), Nr. 7, pp. 1431-1440. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BFb0054144. DOI 10.1007/BFb0054144. ISSN 09168508.

[Adi08] ADIDA, Ben: Helios: Web-based Open-Audit Voting. In: USENIX Security Symposium (2008), 335-348. https://www.usenix.org/legacy/ event/sec08/tech/full_papers/adida/adida.pdf.

[BGN01] BLAIS, André; GIDENGIL, Elisabeth; NEVITTE, Neil: Do Polls Influence the Vote? (2001), 263-279. https://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/ 0472099213-ch11.pdf.

[Bit15a] BITCOIN WIKI: Scalability. https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/ Scalability. Version: September 2015.

[Bit15b] BITCONGRESS.ORG: Decentralized Voting Platform. http://www. bitcongress.org. Version: August 2015.

[Blu15] BLUEKRYPT: Keylength - Cryptographic Key Length from Fact Sheet NSA Suite B Cryptography (2015). http://www.keylength.com/en/6/. Version: September 2015.

[BPW12] BERNHARD, David; PEREIRA, Olivier; WARINSCHI, Bogdan: How not to prove yourself: Pitfalls of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic and applications to Helios. In: Advances in Cryptology-ASIACRYPT 2012. Springer, 2012, pp. 626-643.

[Cha06] CHAOS COMPUTER CLUB E.V.: Bericht der CCC-Wahlbeobachtergruppe von der Oberbürgermeisterwahl in Cottbus. http://www.ccc.de/de/ updates/2006/bericht-ob-wahl-cottbus. Version: 2006.

[Cha13] CHAOS COMPUTER CLUB E.V.: Trügerische Sicherheit - Der elektronische Personalausweis. http://www.ccc.de/de/updates/2013/ epa-mit-virenschutzprogramm. Version: September 2013.

[Coi14] COINDESK: The Bitcoin Mining Arms Race - GHash.io and the 51% Issue. http://www.coindesk.com/ bitcoin-mining-detente-ghash-io-51-issue. Version: July 2014.

[CSWH01] CLARKE, Ian; SANDBERG, Oskar; WILEY, Brandon; HONG, Tw: Freenet: A distributed anonymous information storage and retrieval system. In: Designing Privacy Enhancing . . . (2001), 46-66. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1007/3-540-44702-4_4. DOI 10.1007/3-540-44702-4_4. ISBN 978-3-540-44702-3.

[DAM+15] DURUMERIC, Zakir; ADRIAN, David; MIRIAN, Ariana; BAILEY, Michael; HALDERMAN, J. A.: Tracking the FREAK Attack. https:// freakattack.com. Version: April 2015.

[DDM03] DANEZIS, G.; DINGLEDINE, R.; MATHEWSON, N.: Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol. In: 2003 Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2003. (2003). http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SECPRI. 2003.1199323. DOI 10.1109/SECPRI.2003.1199323. ISBN 0-7695- 1940-7.

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