Detecting Recycled Commodity SoCs: Exploiting Aging-Induced SRAM PUF Unreliability

Preprint English OPEN
Gao, Yansong ; Ma, Hua ; Al-Sarawi, Said F. ; Abbott, Derek ; Ranasinghe, Damith C. (2017)
  • Subject: Computer Science - Cryptography and Security
    acm: ComputingMilieux_MANAGEMENTOFCOMPUTINGANDINFORMATIONSYSTEMS

A physical unclonable function (PUF), analogous to a human fingerprint, has gained an enormous amount of attention from both academia and industry. SRAM PUF is among one of the popular silicon PUF constructions that exploits random initial power-up states from SRAM cells to extract hardware intrinsic secrets for identification and key generation applications. The advantage of SRAM PUFs is that they are widely embedded into commodity devices, thus such a PUF is obtained without a custom design and virtually free of implementation costs. A phenomenon known as `aging' alters the consistent reproducibility---reliability---of responses that can be extracted from a readout of a set of SRAM PUF cells. Similar to how a PUF exploits undesirable manufacturing randomness for generating a hardware intrinsic fingerprint, SRAM PUF unreliability induced by aging can be exploited to detect recycled commodity devices requiring no additional cost to the device. In this context, the SRAM PUF itself acts as an aging sensor by exploiting responses sensitive to aging. We use SRAMs available in pervasively deployed commercial off-the-shelf micro-controllers for experimental validations, which complements recent work demonstrated in FPGA platforms, and we present a simplified detection methodology along experimental results. We show that less than 1,000 SRAM responses are adequate to guarantee that both false acceptance rate and false rejection rate are no more than 0.001.
  • References (27)
    27 references, page 1 of 3

    [1] K. M. Gregory, Counterfeit electronic parts ood U.S. market, accessed: 2017-02-05.

    [2] U. Guin, K. Huang, D. DiMase, J. M. Carulli, M. Tehranipoor, Y. Makris, Counterfeit integrated circuits: a rising threat in the global semiconductor supply chain, Proceedings of the IEEE 102 (8) (2014) 1207{1228.

    [3] G. E. Suh, S. Devadas, Physical unclonable functions for device authentication and secret key generation, in: Proc. Design Automation Conf. (DAC), 2007, pp. 9{14.

    [4] C. Jin, M. van Dijk, Secure and e cient initialization and authentication protocols for SHIELD, IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing.

    [5] Y. Gao, D. C. Ranasinghe, S. F. Al-Sarawi, O. Kavehei, D. Abbott, Emerging physical unclonable functions with nanotechnology, IEEE Access 4 (2016) 61{80.

    [6] A. B. Alvarez, W. Zhao, M. Alioto, Static physically unclonable functions for secure chip identi cation with 1.9{5.8% native bit instability at 0.6{1 V and 15 fJ/bit in 65 nm, IEEE J. SolidState Circuits 51 (3) (2016) 763{775.

    [7] Z. Guo, M. T. Rahman, M. M. Tehranipoor, D. Forte, A zerocost approach to detect recycled SoC chips using embedded SRAM, in: Proc. Symp. Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), IEEE, 2016, pp. 191{196.

    [8] U. Guin, D. Forte, M. Tehranipoor, Design of accurate lowcost on-chip structures for protecting integrated circuits against recycling, IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems 24 (4) (2016) 1233{1246.

    [9] Y. Gao, G. Li, H. Ma, S. F. Al-Sarawi, O. Kavehei, D. Abbott, D. C. Ranasinghe, Obfuscated challenge-response: A secure lightweight authentication mechanism for PUF-based pervasive devices, in: Proc. Int. Conf. Pervasive Computing and Communication (Percom) Workshops, 2016, pp. 1{6.

    [10] M.-D. M. Yu, S. Devadas, Pervasive, dynamic authentication of physical items, Queue 14 (6) (2016) 70.

  • Metrics
    No metrics available
Share - Bookmark