publication . Preprint . Conference object . 2004

NoSEBrEaK - attacking honeynets

M. Dornseif; T. Holz; C.N. Klein;
Open Access English
  • Published: 28 Jun 2004
Abstract
It is usually assumed that honeynets are hard to detect and that attempts to detect or disable them can be unconditionally monitored. We scrutinize this assumption and demonstrate a method how a host in a honeynet can be completely controlled by an attacker without any substantial logging taking place.
Subjects
free text keywords: Computer Science - Cryptography and Security, Computer Science - Computers and Society, K.6.5, K.5.m, Computer science, Condition monitoring, Data security, Computer security, computer.software_genre, computer, Kernel (linear algebra), Information security, Cryptography, business.industry, business, Communication channel, Honeypot, System monitoring

[1] “The honeynet project.” Internet: http://www.honeynet.org/.

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publication . Preprint . Conference object . 2004

NoSEBrEaK - attacking honeynets

M. Dornseif; T. Holz; C.N. Klein;