This paper mainly discusses the puzzle of fifty-fifty split in sharecropping through an improved principal-agent moral hazard framework. Greatly different from the existing literature, this paper finds a new solution to the puzzle of fifty-fifty split in sharecropping. Equal division between the landowner and the tenant regardless of the land’s fertility is incentive compatible, and at the same time the landowner could lease out more fertile land to the relational tenant to improve his utility by using the right of priority. Although fifty-fifty split in sharecropping happens to be fair and comes to be taken for granted as a norm, it is an efficient contractual arrangement in essence.

Ovaj rad uglavnom analizira zagonetku dijeljenja po pola u napoličarenju putem poboljšanog okvira moralnog rizika na relaciji principal-agent. Vrlo različit od postojeće literature, ovaj rad nalazi novo rješenje zagonetke podjele po pola u napoličarenju. Jednaka podjela između vlasnika zemlje i zakupca bez obzira na plodnost zemlje je kompatibilna s poticajima dok istovremeno vlasnik zemlje može iznajmiti plodniju zemlju odnosnom zakupcu kako bi poboljšao svoj položaj koristeći pravo prvenstva. Iako je podjela pola-pola u napoličarenju pravedna i uglavnom se uzima zdravo za gotovo kao norma, u biti je to efikasan ugovorni odnos.