publication . Conference object . Part of book or chapter of book . 2017

The Biases of Thinking Fast and Thinking Slow

Dirk Streeb; Min Chen; Daniel A. Keim;
Open Access English
  • Published: 01 Jan 2017
  • Country: Germany
Abstract
Visualization is a human-centric process, which is inevitably associated with potential biases in humans’ judgment and decision-making. While the discussions on humans’ biases have been heavily influenced by the work of Daniel Kahneman as summarized in his book “Thinking, Fast and Slow’, there have also been viewpoints in psychology in favor of heuristics, such as by Gigerenzer. In this chapter, we present a balanced discourse on the humans’ heuristics and biases as the two sides of the same coin. In particular, we examine these two aspects from a probabilistic perspective, and relate them to the notions of global and local sampling. We use three case studies in...
Subjects
free text keywords: ddc:004, Interactive visualization, Data science, Viewpoints, Visualization, Decision process, Heuristics, Sampling (statistics), Visual analytics, Computer science, Probabilistic logic
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