Endogenous Central Bank Information and the Optimal Degree of Transparency

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Romain Baeriswyl;
  • Journal: International Journal of Central Banking,volume 7,issue 2 June,pages85-111
  • Subject:
    • jel: jel:E52 | jel:E58 | jel:D82

As a policymaker, the central bank both observes and shapes the economy. The central bank scrutinizes market activity to assess the state of the economy, and its policy strongly shapes market outcomes. When transparency allows the central bank to shape the economy more ... View more
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