Bargained stable allocations in assignment markets

Subject: assignment game, core, bargaining problem, Nash solution, KalaiSmorodinsky solution

jel: jel:C78  jel:C71
acm: ComputingMethodologies_ARTIFICIALINTELLIGENCE 

References
(15)
15 references, page 1 of 2
 1
 2
[3] Crawford, V.P., Rochford, S.C.,1986. Bargaining and competition in matching markets. Int. Econ. Rev. 27, 329{348.
[4] Dagan, N., Volij, O., 1993. The bankruptcy problem: A cooperative bargaining approach. Math. Soc. Sci. 26, 287{297.
[5] Davis, M., Maschler, M., 1965. The kernel of a cooperative game. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 12, 223{259.
[6] Demange, G., 1982. Strategyproofness in the Assignment Market Game. Laboratoire d' E¶conom¶etrie de l'E¶ cole Polytechnique, Paris.
[7] Driessen, T.S.H., 1988. A note on the inclusion of the kernel in the core of the bilateral assignment game. Int. J. Game Theory, 27, 301{303.
[14] Nash, J.F., 1950. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 28, 155162.
[15] Nu¶n~ez, M., Rafels, C., 2002. The assignment game: the ¿ {value. Int. J. Game Theory 31, 411422.
[16] Nu¶n~ez, M., Rafels, C., 2003. Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game. Games Econ. Behav. 44, 311{331.
[17] Quint, T., 1991. Characterization of cores of assignment games. Int. J. Game Theory 19, 413{420.
[18] Rochford, S.C., 1984. Symmetrically pairwisebargained allocations in an assignment market. J. Econ. Theory, 34, 262{281.

Similar Research Results
(20)
20 research results, page 1 of 2
 1
 2

Metrics
No metrics available

 Download from


Cite this publication