A Model for Recycling Target Policy under Imperfect Competition With and Without Cooperation Between Firms

Preprint OPEN
Satoshi Honma ; Ming-Chung Chang (2010)
  • Subject: Recycling, Cooperation, Cournot Competition
    • jel: jel:Q53 | jel:L13 | jel:O32

The purpose of this paper is to develop a general theoretical model that describes production and recycling in an n-firm oligopoly market in which firms can cooperate for recycling. We use a three-stage game to analyze a specific recycling issue. In stage 0, the governm... View more
  • References (3)

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    d'Aspremont, C. and Jacquemin, A., 1988. “Cooperative and Non-cooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers,” American Economic Review 78 (5): 1133-1137.

    Bergstrom, T. C. and Varian, H. R., 1985a. “Two Remarks on Cournot Equilibria.”

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