A Continuous-Time Agency Model of Optimal Contracting and Capital Structure

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Peter M. DeMarzo; Yuliy Sannikov;
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    • jel: jel:G32 | jel:D82

We consider a principal-agent model in which the agent needs to raise capital from the principal to finance a project. Our model is based on DeMarzo and Fishman (2003), except that the agent's cash flows are given by a Brownian motion with drift in continuous time. The ... View more
  • References (4)

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