publication . Article . 1999

Tortious Interference with Contract Versus “Efficient” Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Fred S. McChesney;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Jan 1999 Journal: The Journal of Legal Studies, volume 28, pages 131-186 (issn: 0047-2530, eissn: 1537-5366, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Tortious interference is bothersome, normatively and positively, to scholars espousing the economic model of "efficient breach" of contract because it penalizes third-party inducements to breach. Scholars nonetheless find innovative second-best arguments to justify the coexistence of tortious interference with "efficient" breach. This article shows normatively why tortious interference would be part of a first-best legal system. Tortious interference provides property protection to contract rights in ways that apparently (absent data to the contrary) lower transaction costs when a third party values a promisor's performance more than does the promisee. Positivel...
Persistent Identifiers
free text keywords: Law, Transaction cost, Empirical evidence, Efficient breach, Economics, Interference (wave propagation), Economic model, Civil law (legal system), Third party, Law and economics
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