Subject: Earnings manipulation, intertemporal substitution, design of securities, property rights, moral hazard.
jel: jel:G32 | jel:D82 | jel:D92
Existing literature usually considers earnings manipulation to be a negative social phenomenon. We argue that earnings manipulation can be a part of the equilibrium relationships between firm's insiders and outsiders. We consider an optimal contract between an entrepren... View more
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