publication . Article . 1999

Recall in extensive form games

Klaus Ritzberger;
Open Access
  • Published: 16 Feb 1999
Abstract
This paper considers characterizations of perfect recall in extensive form games. It is shown that perfect recall can be expressed in terms of choices without any reference to infomation sets. When information sets are taken into account, it is decomposable into an ordering of information sets and that players do not forget what they knew nor what they did. Thus, if information sets are partially ordered, then perfect recall is implied by the player's inability to refine her information from the memory.
Subjects
arXiv: Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
free text keywords: Extensive form games · perfect recall, Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty, Economics and Econometrics, Statistics and Probability, Social Sciences (miscellaneous), Mathematics (miscellaneous), Recall, Mathematical economics, Extensive-form game, Mathematics, Perfect recall
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publication . Article . 1999

Recall in extensive form games

Klaus Ritzberger;