publication . Article . Preprint . 2002

Legislative Bargaining and Incremental Budgeting

Dhammika Dharmapala;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Oct 2002 Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal (eissn: 1556-5068, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: Elsevier BV
Abstract
The notion of 'incrementalism', formulated by Aaron Wildavsky in the 1960's, has been extremely influential in the public budgeting literature. In essence, it entails the claim that legislators engaged in budgetary policymaking accept past allocations, and decide only on the allocation of increments to revenue. Wildavsky explained incrementalism with reference to the cognitive limitations of lawmakers and their desire to reduce conflict. This paper uses a legislative bargaining framework to undertake a formal analysis of incremental budgeting. An exogenously chosen agenda setter proposes budgets and seeks to build coalitions to secure passage, over multiple peri...
Subjects
free text keywords: Legislative bargaining; incremental budgeting, budgetary institutions, Incrementalism, Incentive, Public budgeting, Public economics, Commit, Economics, Legislature, Microeconomics, Subgame perfect equilibrium, Revenue, Setter, biology.organism_classification, biology, jel:D72, jel:H61
Related Organizations
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publication . Article . Preprint . 2002

Legislative Bargaining and Incremental Budgeting

Dhammika Dharmapala;