publication . Article . 2009

The Basic Economics of Match-Fixing in Sport Tournaments

Raul Caruso;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Jan 2009 Journal: Economic Analysis and Policy (EAP), volume 39, issue 3 December, pages 355-377
Abstract
Match-fixing is a recurring phenomenon of sport contests. This paper presents a simple formal model in order to explain them. The intuition behind is that an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake is the key factor leading to match-fixing or to tacit collusion. In particular, it will be demonstrated that an asymmetry in the evaluation of the stake can lead to a concession from one agent to the other and then to a match-fixing. It is also demonstrated that when the asymmetry in the evaluation is extremely large there is room for tacit collusion. Eventually the intuitions and results of the model will be applied to make a comparison between the FIFA World Cup an...
Subjects
free text keywords: Football, Sport Contest; Contest Management; Match-Fixing; Tacit Collusion; Asymmetry in evaluation; Concession; FIFA; UEFA; World Cup; Champions League, jel:L83, jel:D7, jel:D73, Engineering, business.industry, business, Tacit collusion, League, Microeconomics, Advertising, Match fixing, Phenomenon, Football, Intuition
Powered by OpenAIRE Open Research Graph
Any information missing or wrong?Report an Issue
publication . Article . 2009

The Basic Economics of Match-Fixing in Sport Tournaments

Raul Caruso;