publication . Article . 1990

Improving Channel Coordination Through Franchising

Rajiv Lal;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Jan 1990 Journal: Marketing Science, volume 9, issue 4, pages 299-318
Abstract
In this paper, we explore the role of franchising arrangements in improving coordination between channel members. In particular we focus on two elements of the franchising contract, namely, the royalty structure and the monitoring technology. We begin with a simple analysis where a manufacturer distributes its product through a retailer and the retail demand is affected by the retail price and the service provided by the retailer. In this context we show that neither royalty payments nor monitoring are needed for full coordination. We then extend the model to allow for free riding by franchisees and show that although monitoring helps affect the behavior of the ...
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Persistent Identifiers

doi: 10.1287/mksc.9.4.299

Subjects
free text keywords: franchising, brand name, service, monitoring, moral hazard, Marketing, Business and International Management, Moral hazard, Channel coordination, Payment, media_common.quotation_subject, media_common, Monitoring system, Economics, Retail sales, Free riding, Industrial organization, Communication channel, Incentive
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