publication . Article . 2004

Self-Interested Routing in Queueing Networks

Ali K. Parlaktürk; Sunil Kumar;
Restricted
  • Published: 01 Jan 2004 Journal: Management Science, volume 50, pages 949-966 (issn: 0025-1909, eissn: 1526-5501, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
Abstract
We study self-interested routing in stochastic networks, taking into account the discrete stochastic dynamics of such networks. We analyze a two-station multiclass queueing network in which the system manager chooses the scheduling rule and individual customers choose routes in a self-interested manner. We show that this network can be unstable in Nash equilibrium under some scheduling rules. We also design a nontrivial scheduling rule that negates the performance degradation resulting from self-interested routing and achieves a Nash equilibrium with performance comparable to the first-best solution.
Subjects
free text keywords: queueing networks, routing, scheduling, Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, stability, Management Science and Operations Research, Strategy and Management, Backpressure routing, Layered queueing network, Distributed computing, Mathematical optimization, Queueing theory, Mechanism design, BCMP network, Scheduling (computing), Stochastic dynamics, Nash equilibrium, symbols.namesake, symbols, Computer science
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publication . Article . 2004

Self-Interested Routing in Queueing Networks

Ali K. Parlaktürk; Sunil Kumar;