publication . Article . 2005

Self-Interested Routing in Queueing Networks

Ali K. Parlaktürk; Sunil Kumar;
Open Access
  • Published: 10 Nov 2005 Journal: Management Science, volume 50, issue 7 July, pages 949-966
Abstract
We study self-interested routing in stochastic networks, taking into account the discrete stochastic dynamics of such networks. We analyze a two-station multiclass queueing network in which the system manager chooses the scheduling rule and individual customers choose routes in a self-interested manner. We show that this network can be unstable in Nash equilibrium under some scheduling rules. We also design a nontrivial scheduling rule that negates the performance degradation resulting from self-interested routing and achieves a Nash equilibrium with performance comparable to the first-best solution.
Persistent Identifiers
Subjects
arXiv: Computer Science::Networking and Internet Architecture
ACM Computing Classification System: TheoryofComputation_GENERAL
free text keywords: queueing networks, routing, scheduling, Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, stability, Management Science and Operations Research, Strategy and Management, Computer science, Mechanism design, Queueing theory, Mathematical optimization, Scheduling (computing), Nash equilibrium, symbols.namesake, symbols, Stochastic dynamics
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