Self-Interested Routing in Queueing Networks

Article OPEN
Ali K. Parlaktürk ; Sunil Kumar (2004)
  • Journal: Management Science, volume 50, issue 7 July, pages 949-966
  • Related identifiers: doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0251
  • Subject: queueing networks, routing, scheduling, Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, stability
    acm: TheoryofComputation_GENERAL
    arxiv: Computer Science::Networking and Internet Architecture

We study self-interested routing in stochastic networks, taking into account the discrete stochastic dynamics of such networks. We analyze a two-station multiclass queueing network in which the system manager chooses the scheduling rule and individual customers choose routes in a self-interested manner. We show that this network can be unstable in Nash equilibrium under some scheduling rules. We also design a nontrivial scheduling rule that negates the performance degradation resulting from self-interested routing and achieves a Nash equilibrium with performance comparable to the first-best solution.
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