International Competition for Foreign Multinational Investment,

Preprint OPEN
Jan I. Haaland ; Ian Wooton (1998)
  • Subject: multinationals; foreign direct investment; location
    • jel: jel:F12 | jel:F23

We examine the economic justification for providing investment subsidies to foreign-owned multinationals. These provide employment opportunities and generate demand for domestic intermediate inputs, produced by domestic workers with increasing returns to scale. Offering subsidies to multinationals may be in the national interest if the investment raises the net value of domestic production. When agglomerative forces are sufficiently strong, a subsidy that attracts the first foreign firm may induce several to enter, establishing a thriving modern sector. With a limited number of foreign enterprises, countries may compete to attract investment. This subsidy competition transfers much of the rents to the multinationals.
  • References (7)

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    Figure 4. Equilibria with Competition in Subsidies sf

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