Motivating versus Funding

Preprint OPEN
Nicolas Querou; Antoine Soubeyran; Raphael Soubeyran;
(2015)

We consider a moral hazard problem where the agent's effort induces monetary costs.In such a problem, limits on the agent's resource restrict his capability to exert effort (i.e., constrain his set of possible actions). We show that the optimal contract is, in some case... View more
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