publication . Report . Preprint . Article . Other literature type . 2009

Social background, cooperative behavior, and norm enforcement

Kocher, Martin; Martinsson, Peter; Visser, Martine;
Open Access English
  • Published: 15 Oct 2009
  • Country: Sweden
Abstract
Studies have shown that there are differences in cooperative behavior across countries. Furthermore, differences in the use and the reaction on the introduction of a norm enforcement mechanism have been documented in cross-cultural studies, recently. We present data which prove that stark differences in both dimensions can exist even within the same town. For this end, a unique data set was created, based on public goods experiments conducted in Cape Town, South Africa. Most of the differences in behavior can, however, be explained by variables accounting for social capital and social environment, such as trust or household violence.
Subjects
free text keywords: Cooperation, public goods, punishment, experiment, social capital, South Africa, cooperation, public goods, punishment, experiment, social capital, South Africa, jel:C72, jel:C91, jel:H41, jel:Z13, Economics and Econometrics, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Public economics, Norm enforcement, Economics, Public good, Social environment, Cooperative behavior, Social background, Microeconomics, Social psychology
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publication . Report . Preprint . Article . Other literature type . 2009

Social background, cooperative behavior, and norm enforcement

Kocher, Martin; Martinsson, Peter; Visser, Martine;