Soft Budgets And Highway Franchising

Preprint OPEN
Eduardo Engel; Ronald Fischer; Alexander Galetovic;
(2004)

Latin American governments progressively substituted build–operate–and–transfer (BOT) contracts for government–provided highways during the nineties. Because under BOT a private franchise holder finances and operates the road in exchange for tolls, it is often claimed t... View more
  • References (17)
    17 references, page 1 of 2

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