publication . Article . Preprint . 2015

shareholder activism in banking

Roman, Raluca;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Aug 2015 Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal (eissn: 1556-5068, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: Elsevier BV
Abstract
This paper conducts the first assessment of shareholder activism in banking and its effects on risk and performance. The focus is on the conflicts among bank shareholders, managers, and creditors (e.g., regulators, deposit insurer, taxpayers, depositors). This paper finds activism may generally be a destabilizing force, increasing bank risk-taking, but creating market value for shareholders, and leaving operating returns unchanged, consistent with the empirical dominance of the Shareholder-Creditor Conflict. However, during financial crises, the increase in risk disappears, suggesting activism risk incentives may be muted. From a public perspective, creditors (i...
Subjects
free text keywords: Banking; Financial crises; Financial stability; Shareholder activism, Financial stability, Creditor, Market value, Financial system, Government, Shareholder, Incentive, Business, jel:G01, jel:G21, jel:G28, jel:G38
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publication . Article . Preprint . 2015

shareholder activism in banking

Roman, Raluca;