Gradualism in Tax Treaties with Irreversible Foreign Direct Investment

Preprint OPEN
Richard Chisik; Ronald B. Davies;
(2010)
  • Subject: Foreign Direct Investment, Tax Treaties, Multinational Enterprise, Gradualism, Irreversibilities, Dynamic Games.
    • jel: jel:F13 | jel:F23 | jel:F21 | jel:C73

Bilateral international tax treaties govern the host country taxation for the vast majority of the world’s foreign direct investment (FDI). Of particular interest is the fact that the tax rates used under these treaties are gradually falling although the treaties themse... View more
  • References (4)

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    Blonigen, Bruce and Ronald B. Davies (2000), "The effect of bilateral tax treaties on U.S. FDI activity," NBER Working Paper Series, No. 7929, Cambridge, MA.

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