Correlated Default and Financial Intermediation

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Gregory Phelan;
  • Subject: Financial intermediation, systemic risk, default

Financial intermediation naturally arises when knowledge about the aggregate state is valuable for managing investments and lenders cannot easily observe the aggregate state. I show this using a costly enforcement model in which lenders need ex-post incentives to enforc... View more
  • References (54)
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