The Evolution Of Cooperation In Business: Individual Vs. Group Incentives

Preprint OPEN
Daniel Ladley; Ian Wilkinson; Louise Young;
(2013)
  • Subject: Emergence of cooperation, Incentive systems, Iterated games, Group selection
    • jel: jel:D00 | jel:M52 | jel:C63

Cooperative relations, within and between firms, play important roles in business. How to produce such relations, however, is less well understood. Building on work in evolutionary biology we examine the conditions under which group based incentives result in better per... View more
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