Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty
Subject: Bargaining; Delay; Incomplete Information
jel: jel:C78 | jel:D82
The resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others' preferences. This paper explores, within the context of an infinite-horizon bargaining model with tw...
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