Sharing a common resource with concave benefits

Preprint OPEN
Ambec, S.; (2006)
  • Subject: COMMON RESOURCE; SINGLE PEAK; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; NO ENVY;FAIRNESS
    • jel: jel:D63 | jel:Q20

A group of agents enjoy concave and single-peak benefit functions from consuming a shared resource. They also value money (transfers). The resource is scarce in the sense that not everybody can consume its peak. The paper characterizes the unique (resource and money) al... View more
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