publication . Preprint . 2010

The Aggregation of Individual Distributive Preferences through the Distributive Liberal Social Contract : Normative Analysis.

Jean Mercier-Ythier;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Jan 2010
We consider abstract social systems of private property, made of n individuals endowed with non-paternalistic interdependent preferences, who interact through exchanges on competitive markets and Pareto-efficient lumpsum transfers. The transfers follow from a distributive liberal social contract defined as a redistribution of initial endowments such that the resulting market equilibrium allocation is both Pareto-efficient relative to individual interdependent preferences, and unanimously weakly preferred to the initial market equilibrium. We notably elicit two global properties of Pareto-efficient redistribution in smooth differentiable social systems of the typ...
arXiv: Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
free text keywords: Walrasian equilibrium; Pareto-efficiency; liberal social contract; social preferences; social choice; allocation; distribution., jel:A10, jel:A12, jel:A13, jel:D02, jel:D31, jel:D41, jel:D51, jel:D70, jel:D71, jel:D78, jel:H10, jel:H11, jel:H21, jel:H23, jel:H41, jel:H42, jel:H44, jel:H53, jel:I30, jel:I38, jel:P10, jel:P11, jel:P14, jel:P16, jel:P35, jel:Z13
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