publication . Preprint . 2007

Cost benefit analysis vs. referenda

Martin J. Osborne; Matthew A. Turner;
Open Access
  • Published: 13 Apr 2007
We consider a planner who chooses between two possible public policies and ask whether a referendum or a cost benefit analysis leads to higher welfare. We find that a referendum leads to higher welfare than a cost benefit analyses in "common value" environments. Cost benefit analysis is better in "private value" environments.
free text keywords: Cost benefit analysis, elections, referenda, project evaluation, jel:H43, jel:H11, jel:Q51
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