publication . Article . 2008

Market Discipline and Deposit Insurance

Peresetsky, Anatoly;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Jan 2008 Journal: Applied Econometrics, volume 11, issue 3, pages 3-14
The paper examines Russian banks’ household deposit interest rates for the transition period of setting up the deposit insurance system. Monthly observations of Russian banks’ interest rates and balance sheets are used in a fixed effects panel data model. It is shown market discipline has been significantly diminished after switching to the deposit insurance.
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free text keywords: market discipline; deposit insurance; Russia; deposit interest rates, jel:E43, jel:G22, jel:G21, jel:G32

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