publication . Article . 2012

Competition to commit crime: An economic experiment on illegal logging using behavioral game theory

Tananya Songchoo; Komsan Suriya;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Jan 2012 Journal: The Empirical Econometrics and Quantitative Economics Letters, volume 1, issue 1 March, pages 75-90
Abstract
This study constructs an economic experiment using behavioral game theory to figure out policies that discourage illegal logging in Thailand. A player is assigned to be either a police or an outlaw in the game. The game randomly matches two players in different roles. The lawbreaker can offer a bribe to police under uncertainties whether the police may refuse it or reject the offer because of too small amount of the bribe. Even when bribery is accepted, it is still uncertain for an lawbreaker that he may be arrested afterwards. The study compares the decisions to give bribe and commit illegal logging in two scenarios. First, it compares the results between two r...
Subjects
free text keywords: Illegal logging, bribery, reward and punishment, behavioral game theory, experimental economics, jel:C54, jel:C91, jel:C71
38 references, page 1 of 3

Aidt, Toke S. Economics analysis of corruption: A Survey. The Economics Journal 113. 491 (November 200): pp. F642-F652.

Allen, Franklin and Jun QJ Qian. 2007. Corruption and Competition (August, 2007). Finance Department.

Anti-Corruption Resource Center. 2007. Competition and corruption: What can the donor community do? CMI/U4 No. 8. [online] http://U4.no/themes/private-sector.

Azoulay, D. 1999. Encouragement and Logical Consequences versus Rewards and Punishment: A Reexamination [Electronic Version]. Journal of Individual Psychology 55, 1: pp. 91-99.

Barzel, Yoram. 1974. A Theory of Rationing by Waiting. Journal of Law and Economics 17, 1: pp.73-95. [OpenAIRE]

Basu, Kaushik. 2011. Why, for a class of bribes, the act of giving a bribe should be treated as legal. New Delhi: Government of India.

Beck, Paul J, and Michael W. Maher. 1985. Competition, Regulation, and Bribery. Working paper No.430 (May 1985), Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Michigan.

Belsky, Jay. 2008. Reward are better than Punishment: Here's Why reward are more effective than punishment with children. A Family Affair, Psychology Today. September 25th, 2008. [online] http://psychologytoday.com/blog/familyaffair/200809/rewards-are-better-punishment-here-s-why

Bowles, Samuel. 2003. Microeconomics: Behavior, Institution and Evolution. Princeton University Press, United States of America.

Burguet, Roburt, and Yeon-Koo Che. 2004.Competitive procurement with corruption. RAND Journal of Economics 35,1: pp. 50-68.

Clarke, George R.G. 2010. The Effect of Corruption on Competition for Government Contracts. Division of International Banking and Finance Studies, A.R. Sanchez, Jr. School of Business, Texas A&M International University.

Clarke, George R.G., and Lixin Colin Xu. 2002. Ownership, Competition, and Corruption: Bribe takers versus bribe payers. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2783 (February 2002). [OpenAIRE]

Clarke, George R.G., and Lixin Colin Xu. 2002. Privatization, Competition and Corruption: How Characteristics of Bribe Takers and Payers Affect Bribe Payment to Utilities. Nota Dilavoro 82.2002. [OpenAIRE]

Celentani, Marco, and Juan-Jose Ganuza. 2001. Corruption and competition in procurement (January 2001). Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper No. 464.

Cragg, A.W. 1999. Bribery, Globalization and the problem of dirty hands. Schlich School of Business, York University.

38 references, page 1 of 3
Abstract
This study constructs an economic experiment using behavioral game theory to figure out policies that discourage illegal logging in Thailand. A player is assigned to be either a police or an outlaw in the game. The game randomly matches two players in different roles. The lawbreaker can offer a bribe to police under uncertainties whether the police may refuse it or reject the offer because of too small amount of the bribe. Even when bribery is accepted, it is still uncertain for an lawbreaker that he may be arrested afterwards. The study compares the decisions to give bribe and commit illegal logging in two scenarios. First, it compares the results between two r...
Subjects
free text keywords: Illegal logging, bribery, reward and punishment, behavioral game theory, experimental economics, jel:C54, jel:C91, jel:C71
38 references, page 1 of 3

Aidt, Toke S. Economics analysis of corruption: A Survey. The Economics Journal 113. 491 (November 200): pp. F642-F652.

Allen, Franklin and Jun QJ Qian. 2007. Corruption and Competition (August, 2007). Finance Department.

Anti-Corruption Resource Center. 2007. Competition and corruption: What can the donor community do? CMI/U4 No. 8. [online] http://U4.no/themes/private-sector.

Azoulay, D. 1999. Encouragement and Logical Consequences versus Rewards and Punishment: A Reexamination [Electronic Version]. Journal of Individual Psychology 55, 1: pp. 91-99.

Barzel, Yoram. 1974. A Theory of Rationing by Waiting. Journal of Law and Economics 17, 1: pp.73-95. [OpenAIRE]

Basu, Kaushik. 2011. Why, for a class of bribes, the act of giving a bribe should be treated as legal. New Delhi: Government of India.

Beck, Paul J, and Michael W. Maher. 1985. Competition, Regulation, and Bribery. Working paper No.430 (May 1985), Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Michigan.

Belsky, Jay. 2008. Reward are better than Punishment: Here's Why reward are more effective than punishment with children. A Family Affair, Psychology Today. September 25th, 2008. [online] http://psychologytoday.com/blog/familyaffair/200809/rewards-are-better-punishment-here-s-why

Bowles, Samuel. 2003. Microeconomics: Behavior, Institution and Evolution. Princeton University Press, United States of America.

Burguet, Roburt, and Yeon-Koo Che. 2004.Competitive procurement with corruption. RAND Journal of Economics 35,1: pp. 50-68.

Clarke, George R.G. 2010. The Effect of Corruption on Competition for Government Contracts. Division of International Banking and Finance Studies, A.R. Sanchez, Jr. School of Business, Texas A&M International University.

Clarke, George R.G., and Lixin Colin Xu. 2002. Ownership, Competition, and Corruption: Bribe takers versus bribe payers. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2783 (February 2002). [OpenAIRE]

Clarke, George R.G., and Lixin Colin Xu. 2002. Privatization, Competition and Corruption: How Characteristics of Bribe Takers and Payers Affect Bribe Payment to Utilities. Nota Dilavoro 82.2002. [OpenAIRE]

Celentani, Marco, and Juan-Jose Ganuza. 2001. Corruption and competition in procurement (January 2001). Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper No. 464.

Cragg, A.W. 1999. Bribery, Globalization and the problem of dirty hands. Schlich School of Business, York University.

38 references, page 1 of 3
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