publication . Article . 2013


Paul Prisecaru;
Open Access English
  • Published: 01 Nov 2013 Journal: Global Economic Observer (issn: 2343-9742, eissn: 2343-9750, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: Nicolae Titulescu University
This paper presents some of the most important microeconomic tools used in assessing antitrust and merger cases by the competition authorities. By explaining the way that microeconomic concepts like “market power”, “critical loss” or “price elasticity of demand” are used by the modern competition policy, the microeconomics scholar can get a practical perspective on the way that these concepts fit into the more general concept of “competition policy”. Extensive economic research has shown what are the market forces and economic factors that determine how cartels, which are at the core of antitrust policy, are established and sustained over time. One of the most i...
free text keywords: antitrust, market power, critical loss, cartels, price elasticity of demand, disruptive innovation, Social Sciences, H, Economics as a science, HB71-74, antitrust, market power, critical loss, cartels, price elasticity of demand, disruptive innovation, jel:D43, jel:K21, jel:L40, jel:L10, jel:L13
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