Bureaucratic Corruption: Efficiency Virtue or Distributive Vice?
Governments frequently allocate resources at low prices and on a first-come-first-served basis because of reasons of equity and a concern for the poor. However, bureaucrats who distribute these resources often take bribes. This paper develops a rigorous model to analyze... View more
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