publication . Article . Preprint . 2010

Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Equilibria

Giuseppe De Marco; Jacqueline Morgan;
Open Access
  • Published: 27 Apr 2010 Journal: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, volume 145, pages 429-449 (issn: 0022-3239, eissn: 1573-2878, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media LLC
  • Country: Italy
Abstract
Multicriteria games describe strategic interactions in which players, having more than one criterion to take into account, don't have an a-priori opinion on the relative importance of all these criteria. Roemer (Econ. Bull. 3:1---13, 2005) introduces an organizational interpretation of the concept of equilibrium: each player can be viewed as running a bargaining game among criteria. In this paper, we analyze the bargaining problem within each player by considering the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution (see Kalai and Smorodinsky in Econometrica 43:513---518, 1975). We provide existence results for the so called Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution equilibria...
Subjects
free text keywords: Management Science and Operations Research, Control and Optimization, Applied Mathematics, Game theory, Existence theorem, Mathematical optimization, Trembling hand perfect equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Mathematics, Bargaining problem, Multicriteria analysis, Equilibrium selection
Related Organizations
Powered by OpenAIRE Open Research Graph
Any information missing or wrong?Report an Issue
publication . Article . Preprint . 2010

Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Equilibria

Giuseppe De Marco; Jacqueline Morgan;