KalaiSmorodinsky Bargaining Solution Equilibria

Related identifiers: doi: 10.1007/s109570109697y

References
(10)
[1] Bednarczuk E. (1994): An Approach to Wellposedness in Vector Optimization: Consequences to Stability, Control Cybernetics, 23, 107122.
[2] Berge C. (1959): Espaces Topologiques. Fonctions Multivoques, Dunod, Paris.
[3] Borm P., F. van Megen and S. Tijs (1999): Mathematics of Operations Research 49, 401412.
[9] Puerto J. and F.R. Fernandez (1995): A Re¯nement of the Concept of Equilibrium in Multiple Objective Games, in: W. Takahashi and T. Tanino, Nonlinear Analysis and Convex Analysis World Scienti¯c, Singapore.
[10] Roemer J. (2005). Games with VectorValued Payo®s and their Application to Competition between Organizations, Economics Bulletin, 3, 113.
[11] Roth A.E. (1977): Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem, Journal of Economic Theory, 16, 247251.
[12] Selten R. (1975): Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Estensive Games, International Journal of Game Theory, 4, 2555.
[13] Shapley L.S. (1959): Equilibrium Points in Games with Vector Payo®s, Naval Research Logistics Quaterly 1, 5761.
[14] Wang S.Y. (1993): Existence of Pareto Equilibrium, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 79, 373384.
[15] Yang H. and J. Yu (2002): Essential Components of the Set of Weakly ParetoNash Equilibrium Points, Applied Mathematics Letters, 15, 553560.

Similar Research Results
(20)
20 research results, page 1 of 2
 1
 2

Metrics
No metrics available

 Download from


Cite this publication