publication . Article . 2007

Brokers and Competitive Advantage

Michael D. Ryall; Olav Sorenson;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Jan 2007 Journal: Management Science, volume 53, issue 4 April, pages 566-583
Abstract
The broker profits by intermediating between two (or more) parties. Using a biform game, we examine whether such a position can confer a competitive advantage, as well as whether any such advantage could persist if actors formed relations strategically. Our analysis reveals that, if one considers exogenous the relations between actors, brokers can enjoy an advantage but only if (1) they do not face substitutes either for the connections they offer or the value they can create, (2) they intermediate more than two parties, and (3) interdependence does not lock them into a particular pattern of exchange. If, on the other hand, one allows actors to form relations on...
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free text keywords: games-group decisions, bargaining, organizational studies, networks-graphs, social networks, biform games, strategy, Management Science and Operations Research, Strategy and Management, Social network, business.industry, business, Future value, If and only if, Competitive advantage, Microeconomics, Intermediation, Economics, Game theory, Industrial organization, Empirical research, Organizational studies
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