publication . Preprint . 2009

Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott

Geoffroy de Clippel;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Jan 2009
Abstract
Most contributions in axiomatic bargaining are phrased in the space of utilities. This comes in sharp contrast with standards in most other fields of economic theory. The present paper shows how Nash’s original axiomatic system can be rephrased in a natural class of economic environments with lotteries, and how his uniqueness result can be recovered, provided one completes the system with a property of independence with respect to preferences over unfeasible alternatives. Similar results can be derived for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution if and only if bargaining may involve multiple goods. The paper also introduces a distinction between welfarism and cardinal we...
Subjects
arXiv: Computer Science::Computer Science and Game TheoryComputer Science::Databases
free text keywords: Bargaining; Welfarism; Nash; Kalai-Smorodinsky; Expected Utility
Related Organizations
Funded by
NSF| New Developments in Social Choice and Bargaining Theory: Welfarism and Incomplete Information
Project
  • Funder: National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Project Code: 0851210
  • Funding stream: Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences | Division of Social and Economic Sciences
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