publication . Preprint . 2012

Endogenising Detection in an Asymmetric Penalties Corruption Game

Dominic Spengler;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Jul 2012
We construct a one-shot corruption game with three players, a briber who can decide to bribe or not, an official who can reciprocate or not and an inspector who can decide to inspect or not. We employ four penalties that can be distributed asymmetrically, making it possible to punish bribing and bribe-taking as well as reciprocating and accepting considerations to different degrees. Penalties apply if corruption is detected. The probability of detection is endogenised, as it depends on inspection. The model differs from other inspection games in that the offence (corruption) can only be completed in a joint effort between two of the players. This leads to surpri...
free text keywords: Inspection game, Corruption, Asymmetric penalties, Endogenising detection, jel:K42, jel:H00, jel:C72, jel:O17
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