publication . Article . Other literature type . 2004

The Cost Effectiveness of the U.S. Export Enhancement Program Bonus Allocation Mechanism

Humei Wang; Richard J. Sexton;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 May 2004 Journal: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, volume 86, pages 375-388 (issn: 0002-9092, eissn: 1467-8276, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: Wiley
Abstract
The U.S. Export Enhancement Program is evaluated from the perspective of the cost effectiveness of its bonus allocation mechanism. The current mechanism resembles a discriminatory-price, common-value auction. However, auction theory suggests that a discriminatory auction may not be optimal in this setting for several reasons. This article evaluates the current format relative to an alternative, uniform-price auction. Estimation results reveal evidence of strategic bidder behavior under the current format and simulations suggest that adopting a uniform-price auction format for bonus allocation may yield considerable savings to the Treasury by eliminating incentiv...
Persistent Identifiers
Subjects
ACM Computing Classification System: TheoryofComputation_GENERALTheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
free text keywords: Agricultural and Biological Sciences (miscellaneous), Economics and Econometrics, English auction, Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction, Generalized second-price auction, Vickrey auction, Revenue equivalence, Reverse auction, Auction theory, Economics, Dutch auction, Microeconomics, Industrial organization
Any information missing or wrong?Report an Issue