Management Ownership and Risk-Shifting Investment

Article OPEN
Nobuyuki Teshima;
(2012)
  • Journal: The Japanese Accounting Review,volume 2,issue December,pages75-85
  • Subject: Management Ownership; Risk Shifting; Debt Restructuring; Reorganization; Bankruptcy
    • jel: jel:G34 | jel:G33 | jel:G32

This study analyzes the relationship between management ownership and its risk-shifting incentive. We first present a simple model showing that the risk-shifting incentive of management of financially distressed firms increases as the management ownership of the firm in... View more
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