publication . Article . Report . Preprint . 2014

Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws

Daron Acemoglu; Matthew O. Jackson;
Restricted
  • Published: 01 Aug 2014 Journal: SSRN Electronic Journal (eissn: 1556-5068, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: Elsevier BV
Abstract
We examine the interplay between social norms and the enforcement of laws. Agents choose a behavior (e.g., tax evasion, production of low-quality products, corruption, substance abuse, etc.) and then are randomly matched with another agent. An agent's payoff decreases with the mismatch between her behavior and her partner's, as well as average behavior in society. A law is an upper bound (cap) on behavior and a law-breaker, when detected, pays a fine and has her behavior forced down to the level of the law. Law-breaking depends on social norms because detection relies, at least in part, on private cooperation and whistle-blowing. Law-abiding agents have an incen...
Subjects
free text keywords: Externality, Corruption, media_common.quotation_subject, media_common, Incentive, Law enforcement, Stochastic game, Economics, Tax evasion, Enforcement, Law, Norm (social), jel:C72, jel:C73, jel:P16, jel:Z1
Funded by
NSF| Studies of Social Structure and Economic Behavior
Project
  • Funder: National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Project Code: 0961481
  • Funding stream: Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences | Division of Social and Economic Sciences
,
NSF| Collaborative Research: Social Networks and Microfinance
Project
  • Funder: National Science Foundation (NSF)
  • Project Code: 1155302
  • Funding stream: Directorate for Social, Behavioral & Economic Sciences | Division of Social and Economic Sciences

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publication . Article . Report . Preprint . 2014

Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws

Daron Acemoglu; Matthew O. Jackson;