publication . Preprint . 2002

Maps of Bounded Rationality

Kahneman, Daniel;
Open Access
  • Published: 08 Dec 2002
Abstract
The work cited by the Nobel committee was done jointly with the late Amos Tversky (1937-1996) during a long and unusually close collaboration. Together, we explored the psychology of intuitive beliefs and choices and examined their bounded rationality. This essay presents a current perspective on the three major topics of our joint work: heuristics of judgment, risky choice, and framing effects. In all three domains we studied intuitions - thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and without much reflection. I review the older research and some recent developments in light of two ideas that have become central to social-cognitive psychology in the inte...
Subjects
free text keywords: behavioral economics; experimental economics, jel:C90
Related Organizations
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