publication . Preprint . 2010

Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation for War

Slantchev, Branislav L.; Tarar, Ahmer S.;
Open Access
  • Published: 04 Jul 2010
Abstract
Blainey (1988) argued that crises are more likely to end in war when two nations disagree about their relative power. Fey and Ramsay (2007) claim that this widely used “mutual optimism” explanation is theoretically incoherent. Their criticism neglects the need to specify a behavioral causal mechanism that links beliefs to the outbreak of war. We show how the rationalist game-theoretic work on the causes of war provides such mechanisms: the risk-return trade-off and costly signaling, and demonstrate that these models are immune to Fey and Ramsay’s critiques. We also show that the class of models Fey and Ramsay propose make the substantively unwarranted assumption...
Subjects
free text keywords: bargaining model of war, mutual optimism, causes of war, agree to disagree, jel:H56, jel:C7
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