publication . Article . Preprint . 2013

Conundrums for nonconsequentialists

John A Weymark;
Open Access
  • Published: 26 Jun 2013 Journal: Social Choice and Welfare, volume 48, pages 269-294 (issn: 0176-1714, eissn: 1432-217X, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: Springer Nature
There are a number of single-profile impossibility theorems in social choice theory and welfare economics that demonstrate the incompatibility of dominance criteria with various nonconsequentialist principles given some rationality restrictions on the rankings being considered. This article is concerned with examining what they have in common and how they differ. Groups of results are identified that have similar formal structures and are established using similar proof strategies.
free text keywords: consequentialism, welfarism, social choice, welfare economics, Economics, Pareto principle, Welfarism, Impossibility, Social policy, Social choice theory, Welfare economics, Consequentialism, Arrow's impossibility theorem, Mathematical economics, Rationality, jel:D6, jel:D7
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publication . Article . Preprint . 2013

Conundrums for nonconsequentialists

John A Weymark;