Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model

Preprint OPEN
Wang, Cheng;
(2005)
  • Subject: dynamic contract; termination; labor market equilibrium
    • jel: jel:E20 | jel:J41 | jel:J63

I construct an equilibrium model of the labor market where workers and firms enter into dyamic contracts that can potentially last forever, but are subject to optimal terminations. Upon a termination, the firm hires a new worker, and the worker who is terminated receive... View more
  • References (19)
    19 references, page 1 of 2

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