Preferences for government enforcement of a common pool harvest quota: Theory and experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia

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Maria Alejandra Velez; John K. Stranlund; James J. Murphy; (2012)
  • Subject: common pool resources, field experiments, institutions, communication, regulation, voting
    • jel: jel:Q28 | jel:D72 | jel:Q20 | jel:C93

We examine individual harvesters’ preferences for government enforcement of a quota imposed on the exploitation of a common pool resource. We develop a model of Nash behavior by identical risk neutral harvesters to explain individual equilibrium preferences for enforcem... View more
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