publication . Preprint . 2006

EDUCATION AND FAMILY INCOME: CAN POOR CHILDREN SIGNAL THEIR TALENT?

Gonzalo Olcina Vauteren; Luisa Escriche;
Open Access
  • Published: 01 Oct 2006
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to explain how financial constraints and family background characteristics affect the signalling educational investments of individuals born in low-income families. We show that talented students who are poor are unable to signal their talent, as the maximum level of education they can attain may also be achieved by less talented students who are rich. Under this approach, a de-crease in inequalities across generations cannot be expected. The paper also shows that an increase in educational standards would help poor individuals with high-ability if it is combined with other non-monetary measures.
Subjects
free text keywords: Market selection hypothesis, General Equilibrium with Incomplete markets, Wealth accumulation, jel:I20, jel:C70

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