publication . Preprint . Other literature type . Article . Part of book or chapter of book . 2017

Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form

Yingyi Qian; Eric S. Maskin; Chenggang Xu;
Open Access
  • Published: 08 Dec 2017
Abstract
February 6, 1999 We model an organization as a hierarchy of managers erected on top of a technology (here consisting of a collection of plants). In our framework, the role of a manager is to take steps to reduce the adverse consequences of shocks that affect the plants beneath him. We argue that different organizational forms give rise to different information about managers' performance and therefore differ according to how effective incentives can be in encouraging a good performance. In particular, we show that, under certain assumptions, the M-form (multi-divisional form) is likely to provide better incentives than the U-form (unitary form) because it promot...
Subjects
free text keywords: Economics and Econometrics, Economics, Unitary state, Incentive, Hierarchy, Organizational form, Yardstick, Microeconomics
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publication . Preprint . Other literature type . Article . Part of book or chapter of book . 2017

Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form

Yingyi Qian; Eric S. Maskin; Chenggang Xu;