publication . Article . 2013

La tragedia de los anticomunes en la construcción del conocimiento del genoma humano

Osorio, Helder; Lara, Arturo;
Open Access Spanish
  • Published: 01 Dec 2013
  • Publisher: División de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades, UAM-Unidad Xochimilco
Abstract
El presente artículo estudia los diferentes factores dentro de los cuales los agentes relacionados con el estudio del genoma humano, al enfrentarse a la fragmentación en la propiedad intelectual, pueden (o no) lograr acuerdos de cooperación para así evitar la tragedia de los anticomunes. Se considera como factores claves: la naturaleza compleja de gen/función; la evolución de los derechos formales e informales de propiedad, y las características de los agentes. This article examines the different factors under which, the agents related to human genome research, when they cope with IP fragmentation, can (or not) to achieve cooperation agreements in order to avoid...
Subjects
free text keywords: Anticomunes, conocimiento, genoma humano, reglas informales, teoría de juegos, derechos de propiedad intelectual, estrategias de agentes, Anticommons, knowledge, human genome, informal rules, game theory, intellectual property rights, agent's strategie
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