publication . Article . 2017

Double effect, doing and allowing, and the relaxed nonconsequentialist

Woollard, Fiona;
Open Access
  • Published: 13 Oct 2017 Journal: Philosophical Explorations, volume 20, pages 142-158 (issn: 1386-9795, eissn: 1741-5918, Copyright policy)
  • Publisher: Informa UK Limited
  • Country: United States
Abstract
Many philosophers display relaxed scepticism about the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA) and the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), suspecting, without great alarm, that one or both of these Doctrines is indefensible. This relaxed scepticism is misplaced. Anyone who aims to endorse a theory of right action with Nonconsequentialist implications (henceforth any Nonconsequentialist) should accept both the DDA (or a replacement) and the DDE (or a replacement). First, even to state a Nonconsequentialist theory requires drawing a distinction between respecting and promoting values. This cannot be done without accepting some deontological distinction. Second, if someo...
Subjects
free text keywords: Philosophy, Epistemology, Skepticism, media_common.quotation_subject, media_common, Principle of double effect, Doctrine, Social psychology
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publication . Article . 2017

Double effect, doing and allowing, and the relaxed nonconsequentialist

Woollard, Fiona;